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AN EVALUATION OF ALASKA’S
STANDARD FOR WAGE AND HOUR
EXEMPTIONS
BY GREGORY S. FISHER*
ABSTRACT
What burden of proof should govern wage and hour exemptions under
Alaska law? Under federal law, the majority rule is that wage and
hour exemptions are established by a preponderance of the evidence.
However, in Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey the Alaska Supreme
Court adopted a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, the most
stringent burden that could be imposed. This Article explains why
the Fred Meyer standard conflicts with precedent, reason, and policy
and proposes an analytical model for either the Alaska Supreme Court
or the Alaska Legislature to use in abandoning Fred Meyer and
adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard.

INTRODUCTION
In the classic formulation well-known to Alaska lawyers, Alaska
courts will “adopt the rule of law that is most persuasive in light of
precedent, reason, and policy.”1 However, is this necessarily correct? In
the 1993 opinion Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc.,2 the Alaska Supreme
Court quoted, in dicta, a federal lower court opinion for the proposition
that wage and hour exemptions should be denied if there was a
reasonable doubt as to their applicability.3 Eleven years later in Fred
Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey,4 the Alaska Supreme Court applied this
dicta to hold that a “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” governed
* J.D., University of Washington School of Law (1991). B.A., State
University of New York, Binghamton (1988). The author is a partner with Davis
Wright Tremaine LLP in its Anchorage office. The views expressed in this
Article are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of Davis
Wright Tremaine or its clients. This article is dedicated to the late Judge James
M. Fitzgerald, a great judge and Alaskan.
1. Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1284 n.6 (Alaska 1979); see also United States v.
CNA Fin. Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1097 (D. Alaska 2005).
2. 848 P.2d 1367 (Alaska 1993).
3. Id. at 1372.
4. 100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004).
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analysis of wage and hour exemptions.5 This is the most stringent
standard that could be imposed. The court adopted this standard
without explanation or analysis.6 Instead, it simply cited Dayhoff, which
itself cited a Court of Claims opinion7 analyzing a threshold
jurisdictional issue and quoting a policy from the Civil Service
Commission (an agency that does not even exist anymore, having been
replaced by the Office of Personnel Management). In short, traced back
to its origins, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is based on an
attempt by an official for a now defunct federal agency to articulate the
concept that exemptions are narrowly construed. Moreover, in adopting
this elevated burden of proof, the court ignored the settled principle that
the default burden of proof in civil actions should be the preponderance
of the evidence standard. Subsequent statutory amendments to the
Alaska Wage and Hour Act cast further doubt on Fred Meyer’s result.
This Article briefly reviews wage and hour principles, explains
why the Fred Meyer standard conflicts with precedent, reason, and
policy, and proposes an analytical model for either the Alaska Supreme
Court or the Alaska Legislature to use in abandoning Fred Meyer and
adopting a preponderance of the evidence standard. Part I briefly
reviews background principles and developments in the law necessary
for an understanding of the Fred Meyer standard. Part II analyzes the
Fred Meyer standard and concludes that it is an unsound rule that should
be abandoned. Part III discusses judicial and legislative options that
could be applied for purposes of addressing and correcting Fred Meyer.8

I.
A.

THE ROAD TO FRED MEYER

A Brief Review of State and Federal Wage and Hour Law

This Article is not intended as a comprehensive review of wage and
hour principles. However, a brief review of significant concepts is
necessary in order to evaluate the Fred Meyer standard in context. Wage
and hour law establishes rules governing compensation for employees.
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is the federal scheme enacted
during the Great Depression both as a means of improving working

5. Id. at 884.
6. Id.
7. Dayhoff, 848 P.2d at 1372.
8. The author principally represents employers and businesses and has
directly or indirectly litigated the burden of proof issue in two prior cases:
Motion for Rule of Law, Borge v. Getronics USA, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-105(TMB) (D.
Alaska dismissed May 14, 2009) and Motion for Rule of Law, Black v. Colaska,
Inc., No. C07-0823 JLR (W.D. Wash. appeal dismissed Mar. 26, 2009).
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standards and as an incentive to encourage employers to hire more
workers.9 Its chief components are establishment of a minimum wage
and a premium, or overtime, rate that is calculated based on the
minimum wage.10 Overtime is the pay rate that employers must pay
when employees work over a specified number of hours.11 The overtime
rate is one and one half the regular rate of pay.12 For example, if an
employee’s regular rate of pay was twelve dollars per hour of work, his
or her overtime rate would be eighteen dollars per hour of work ($12 x
1.5 = $18). If an employee is entitled to overtime, the overtime rate is
paid for all work over forty hours in a given workweek.13 The Alaska
Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) is patterned after the FLSA and
incorporates many of the same terms with a few significant variations
discussed further below.
Indeed, the FLSA and the AWHA were both enacted for the same
general purpose: “to establish minimum wage, maximum workweek,
and overtime compensation standards which are adequate to maintain
the health, efficiency and general well-being of workers.”14 In a sense,
the AWHA supplements the FLSA in that it covers entities not engaged
in interstate commerce; otherwise such entities would avoid the
requirements of the FLSA.15 That is, the AWHA functions as a backstop
to ensure that employers engaged solely in intrastate commerce are
nevertheless covered by wage and hour requirements.
Courts frequently describe wage and hour law as being remedial
legislation enacted for the benefit of workers.16 This accurately reflects
public policy findings declared by both the FLSA and the AWHA.17
However, an often overlooked or underappreciated concept underlying
the FLSA was to spur job growth.18 The nation was mired in the Great

9. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219) (2006). The FLSA’s policy goals
are set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 202.
10. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2006) (minimum wage); 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) (overtime).
11. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2).
12. Id. § 207(a).
13. Id. § 207(a)(2)(C).
14. Webster v. Bechtel, 621 P.2d 890, 896 (Alaska 1980).
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Whitesides v. U-Haul Co. of Alaska, 16 P.3d 729, 732 (Alaska
2001).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (FLSA); ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.050 (2010) (AWHA).
18. See JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN 66–67 (1991); see also Yi v.
Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2007) (“The purposes [of
the FLSA] are to spread work in order to reduce unemployment, to discourage
(by increasing the cost to the employer) a degree of overtime that might impair
workers’ health or safety, and to increase the welfare of low-paid workers.”); cf.
Janes v. Otis Eng’g Corp., 757 P.2d 50, 53 (Alaska 1988) (understanding Alaska’s
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Depression, and the FLSA was a product of social engineering. Its key
components (a forty-hour workweek, the establishment of a minimum
wage, and overtime) were designed, in part, to encourage employers to
hire more employees.19 For example, the concept was that if an employer
had one employee who usually worked sixty hours in a week, the
employer would have an incentive to hire another worker because it
would be more cost effective for the employer to hire a part-time
employee to work the extra twenty hours rather than pay the full-time
employee an overtime rate.
1. Key elements of wage and hour law
Under the FLSA, the key time period is forty hours in a given
workweek.20 A workweek is any period of seven consecutive twentyfour hour days.21 The employer defines the workweek but may not do so
in a manner designed to evade overtime requirements.22 An employee
eligible for overtime is paid overtime for all work over forty hours in
that workweek.23 In the prior example, if the employee worked fortyseven hours in one workweek, his or her wages for that week would be
$606 ($12/hour X 40 = $480 + $18/hour X 7 = $126). The AWHA
incorporates the same forty-hour workweek standard but also includes a
daily time period of eight hours a day.24
The concept of being employed is broadly defined under both the
FLSA and the AWHA. To employ means “to suffer or permit to work.”25
All employees are eligible for the minimum wage and overtime unless
they are exempt. Accordingly, a critical concept in wage and hour law
concerns the classification of employees as exempt or non-exempt.26
Exemptions are established by law. The exemptions often overlap; that
is, an employee classified as exempt under one exemption may also be
classified as exempt under another exemption as well.

version of the fair labor act similarly).
19. Cf. SCHOR, supra note 18, at 66–67.
20. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2006).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 778.105 (2010).
22. Id.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a); 29 C.F.R. §§ 778.100–778.101 (2010).
24. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(a) (2010).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006). Alaska law incorporates federal definitions
except where Alaska expressly defines a concept differently. ALASKA STAT. §
23.10.145 (2010).
26. Another important concept involves the classification of workers as
employees or independent contractors, the latter not being subject to wage and
hour principles. See Jeffcoat v. State, Dep’t of Labor, 732 P.2d 1073, 1075 (Alaska
1987). This sub-issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
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The AWHA includes seventeen exemptions that apply to both state
minimum wage and overtime requirements,27 nineteen exemptions that
apply to state overtime requirements,28 and three exemptions that apply
to minimum wage.29 The FLSA includes eleven exemptions that apply to
federal minimum wage and overtime requirements30 and twenty-one
that apply to federal overtime.31
Some of these exemptions are “industry” exemptions that exclude
coverage for employees in an entire industry. For example, under the
AWHA, agricultural workers are exempt from the Act.32 Others are
“business-related” exemptions that exclude coverage for businesses of a
certain size. For example, under the AWHA, employers that employ less
than four employees in the regular course of business are exempt from
the Act’s overtime requirements,33 as are lumber operations employing
fewer than twelve employees.34 “Worker-related” exemptions exclude
certain specific workers from coverage, such as executives,
administrative employees, professionals, outside sales personnel, and
computer analysts (if they satisfy prescribed regulatory standards).35
These are merely illustrative examples.
Of these three general exemption categories, the industry and
business-related exemptions usually pose little or no difficulty in
interpreting and applying the relevant standards because the
exemptions are generally straightforward. Employers will usually know
whether or not they fit the defined concepts. However, the workerrelated exemptions often pose more significant challenges because they
depend upon analysis of each worker’s actual job duties in connection
with the relevant legal standards governing the exemption in question.
2. Interpreting and applying “white collar” exemptions
The worker-related exemptions that pose the most significant
analytical and practical problems are the so-called Section 13(a)(1), or
“white collar,” exemptions.36 Three of the more difficult “white collar”
exemptions are the exemptions for executive, administrative, and

27. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(a) (2010).
28. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(d).
29. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.070.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)–(17) (2006). Six of these subdivisions have been
repealed. See, e.g., id. § 213(a)(2) (repealed 1989).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b). Note that nine of the subsections of this statute have
been repealed. See, e.g., id. § 213(b)(4) (repealed 1974).
32. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(a)(1), (10).
33. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(d).
34. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(d)(9).
35. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(a)(9).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
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professional employees. These exemptions depend upon application of
the salary basis test. In order to qualify for an exemption: (1) the
employee must be paid a salary;37 (2) the salary amount must meet
minimum threshold levels; and (3) the employee may perform only
certain duties that are described in the regulation.38 The federal salary
threshold for most of the white collar exemptions is $455 per week.39
The Alaska standard is $620 per week.40
The “white collar” exemptions are defined by dense regulatory
language that frequently embraces deceptively misleading concepts. For
example, in order to qualify for an administrative employee exemption,
an employee’s “primary duty” must be performing office or non-manual
work that is “directly related to the management or general business
operations” of the employer, and the employee’s primary duty must
include exercising “discretion and independent judgment with respect
to matters of significance.”41 An executive employee must have the
“primary duty” of “management” of the enterprise, must “customarily
and regularly” direct the work of two or more employees, and must
have authority to make significant decisions or recommendations that
are accorded weight.42
All of these concepts are terms of art, and there is an “Alice in
Wonderland”-like quality to wage and hour regulations. By way of
illustration, “primary duty” means the main or important duty, but the
term is not defined by relation to the amount of time spent on exempt
work.43 Instead, “the character of the employee’s job as a whole” is the
relevant benchmark for evaluating a primary duty.44 Time spent
performing exempt work may be relevant, but an employee need not
spend most of his or her time performing exempt work in order to be
classified as exempt.45 Consequently, an employee’s primary duty can
be, in theory, a duty that is performed less than a majority of the total
time spent working.46

37. Payment on a salary basis requires that the employee be paid a fixed,
recurring amount each workweek without consideration for the hours worked
and without reduction for the quality or quantity of work. 29 C.F.R. § 541.602
(2010).
38. 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.600–541.601.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 541.600(a).
40. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(b). This amounts to twice the minimum wage,
$7.75 per hour, for 40 hours worked in a week. Id.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a).
42. 29 C.F.R. § 541.100(a).
43. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a)–(b).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(a).
45. 29 C.F.R. § 541.700(b).
46. Id.

FISHER_FINAL

2011

5/5/2011 3:20:29 PM

WAGE & HOUR EXEMPTION STANDARD

103

“Customarily and regularly” is defined as “a frequency that must
be greater than occasional but which, of course, may be less than
constant.”47 This leaves employers and their counsel on an uncertain
regulatory continuum. “Directly and closely related” tasks are defined
as “tasks that are related to exempt duties and that contribute to or
facilitate performance of exempt work.”48 However, such work “may
include physical tasks and menial tasks that arise out of exempt duties,
and the routine work without which the exempt employee’s exempt
work cannot be performed properly.”49
Exercising “discretion and independent judgment . . . involves the
comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct[] and
acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been
considered.”50 The relevant factors emphasize an employee’s authority
to independently function in a variety of managerial-related tasks.51
“However, employees can exercise discretion and independent
judgment even if their decisions or recommendations are reviewed at a
higher level.”52 Indeed, the regulations emphasize the fact that an
employee’s decisions or recommendations “are revised or reversed after
review does not mean that the employee is not exercising discretion and
independent judgment.”53
Even a concept as seemingly straightforward as “management” can
present interpretative obstacles. The definition includes classic
managerial duties such as:
[I]nterviewing, selecting, and training of employees;
setting and adjusting their rates of pay and hours of
work; directing the work of employees; maintaining
production or sales records for use in supervision or
control; [and] appraising work performance; handling
employee complaints and grievances; disciplining
employees; planning the work; determining the

47. 29 C.F.R. § 541.701.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 541.703(a).
49. Id.
50. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a).
51. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b). These include, among others, the “authority to
formulate . . . policies; . . . authority to commit the employer in matters that have
significant financial impact; . . . authority to waive or deviate from established
policies and procedures without prior approval; . . . authority to negotiate and
bind the company on significant matters; . . . [and] represent[ing] the company
in handling [disciplinary matters and proceedings].” Id.
52. 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(c).
53. Id.
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techniques to be used; [and] apportioning the work
among the employees.54
However, “management” also includes duties that a filing clerk or
receptionist could perform, such as:
[D]etermining the type of materials, supplies,
machinery, equipment or tools to be used or
merchandise to be bought, stocked and sold; controlling
the flow and distribution of materials or merchandise
and supplies; providing for the safety and security of
the employees or the property; planning and controlling
the budget; and monitoring or implementing legal
compliance measures.55
These are merely representative examples to illustrate some of the
definitions that employers and their counsel must wrestle with when
evaluating whether employees should be classified as exempt or nonexempt. As can be seen from these examples, there is considerable
“play” with respect to the regulatory concepts that govern wage and
hour law. Oftentimes, interpretation is subject to conflicting case law or
agency decisions and opinions that are not always consistent with one
another.56 The point in briefly highlighting these regulatory definitions
is to place the burden of proof issue into an understandable context.
Wage and hour law is not as simple as merely marshalling the
proverbial “mountain of evidence.” Instead, it is fair to comment that it
is not always immediately clear what specific evidence is necessary or
useful with respect to specific exemptions.

54. 29 C.F.R. § 541.102 (2010).
55. Id.
56. For example, for several years the United States Department of Labor
classified mortgage loan officers as exempt administrative employees.
However, on March 24, 2010, Deputy Administrator Leppink issued new
guidance concluding that mortgage loan officers were non-exempt. See U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, ADMINISTRATOR’S INTERPRETATION NO. 2010-1 (2010). Another
example is seen in how employees working as computer professionals are
classified. Courts have issued a wide range of conflicting opinions that are not
always easily reconcilable. Compare Koppinger v. Am. Interiors, Inc., 295 F.
Supp. 2d 797, 802 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (computer professional exempt because the
troubleshooting being performed involved investigating problems, considering
possible solutions, and implementing the solution deemed best for the situation,
all indicia of discretion and independent judgment), with Turner v. Human
Genome Sci., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742, 747 (D. Md. 2003) (computer
professionals non-exempt because the troubleshooting that they performed did
not involve exercise of discretion and independent judgment).
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Standards and Burden of Proof for Analyzing Exemptions

Certain principles govern analysis of wage and hour exemptions.
Under the FLSA, exemptions are affirmative defenses for which the
employer carries the burden of proof.57 The United States Supreme
Court has held that they are to be narrowly construed58 and must be
plainly and unmistakably established.59 Some circuit courts have added
an additional interpretative guideline by instructing that exemptions
must be proved by “clear and affirmative” evidence.60
Alaska courts apply comparable principles for analyzing
exemptions under the AWHA.61 Exemptions are “narrowly construed
and limited to those ‘plainly and unmistakably within their terms and
spirit.’”62
Although these principles alert an employer to the importance of
meeting its burden, the overwhelming majority rule is that the actual
burden of proof for establishing an exemption remains the
preponderance of the evidence standard. Four United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal studying this issue (the Sixth,63 Seventh,64 Ninth, 65 and
Eleventh66 Circuits) have held that the burden remains a preponderance
of the evidence standard. Additionally, federal district courts in six
circuits (the First,67 Second,68 Third,69 Fifth,70 Eighth,71 and Eleventh72)

57. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196–97 (1974).
58. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960).
59. A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945).
60. Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 725 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1984).
61. See Whitesides v. U-Haul Co. of Alaska, 16 P.3d 729, 732 (Alaska 2001).
62. Id. (quoting Arnold, 361 U.S. at 392).
63. Thomas v. Speedway Superamerica LLC, 506 F.3d 496, 501–02 (6th Cir.
2007); Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2007).
64. Yi v. Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 506–09 (7th Cir. 2007).
65. Dickenson v. United States, 353 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1966); Coast Van
Lines v. Armstrong, 167 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1948).
66. Dybach v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1566 n.5 (11th Cir. 1991).
67. Reeves v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 242, 250 (D.R.I. 1999).
68. Golden v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 06 Civ. 2970(RWS), 2007 WL 4299443
at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2007); Moran v. GTL Constr., LLC, No. 06 Civ. 168(SCR),
2007 WL 2142343 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2007); Khan v. IBI Armored Servs., Inc.,
474 F. Supp. 2d 448, 456 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 504 F.
Supp. 404, 406–07 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), aff’d, 675 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1980).
69. Caminiti v. Cnty. of Essex, Civ. No. 04-4276 (WHW), 2007 WL 2226005 at
*8 (D.N.J. July 31, 2007).
70. Cash v. Conn Appliances, Inc., 2 F. Supp. 2d 884, 892 (E.D. Tex. 1997);
Dahlheim v. KDFW-TV, 706 F. Supp. 493, 503–04 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 918 F.2d
1220 (5th Cir. 1990).
71. Goldman v. RadioShack Corp., No. Civ.A. 03-0032, 2006 WL 336020 at *7
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2006); Shaw v. Prentice Hall, Inc., 977 F. Supp. 909, 913 (S.D.
Ind. 1997); Kowalski v. Kowalski Heat Treating Co., 920 F. Supp. 799, 806 (N.D.
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have applied the preponderance of the evidence standard or stated that
this was the rule that governed in their respective circuits. One state
court that has squarely confronted the issue also concluded that the
burden should be by a preponderance of the evidence.73 Consistent with
the majority rule, Federal Civil Pattern Jury Instructions provide for a
preponderance of the evidence standard.74
In Renfro v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., the Sixth Circuit declined to
apply a heightened standard of proof for the establishment of an
exemption.75 The court observed that the Tenth Circuit had used the
phrase “clear and affirmative” in regard to the employer’s burden in
Donovan v. United Video, Inc.,76 without explanation, by citing to a prior
United States Supreme Court opinion.77 However, the Sixth Circuit
noted that the Supreme Court opinion cited in Donovan did “not raise
the evidentiary burden; [but instead] it merely clarified that the
applicability of an FLSA exemption is an affirmative defense.”78 The
panel explained, “[w]e clarify here that the phrase ‘clear and affirmative
evidence’ does not heighten [an employer’s] evidentiary burden when
moving for summary judgment.”79 The court instructed:
The word “clear,” as used in this phrase, traces to the
“clearly erroneous” Rule 52(a) standard, but that
standard is inapposite to our current review of a motion
for summary judgment. And because establishing the
applicability of an FLSA exemption is an affirmative
defense, [employers have] the burden to establish
[exemptions] by a prepondrance of the evidence[.]80
The case of Yi v. Sterling Collision Centers, Inc. provides another
example of an application of the preponderance standard.81 There, the
Seventh Circuit rejected arguments that a heightened burden of proof
should be used to evaluate wage and hour exemptions.82 The court

Ohio 1996); Fight v. Armour & Co., 533 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
72. Rossi v. Associated Limousine Servs., Inc., 438 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1359
(S.D. Fla. 2006).
73. See Mitchell v. Pemco Mut. Ins. Co., 142 P.3d 623, 626 (Wash. Ct. App.
2006).
74. See 3C Kevin F. O’Malley, Jay E. Grenig & William C. Lee, Federal Jury
Practice and Instructions §§ 175.40, 175.50, 175.71 (5th ed. 2000).
75. Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2007).
76. 725 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1984).
77. Renfro, 497 F.3d at 576; see also Donovan, 725 F.2d at 581.
78. Renfro, 497 F.3d at 576.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Yi v. Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 505 (7th Cir. 2007).
82. Id. at 507–08.
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observed that considerable confusion had arisen from the use of phrases
such as “clearly” and “affirmatively” or “plainly” and
“unmistakablely.”83 Properly construed, these phrases did not affect the
burden of proof but instead appeared to be “merely a clumsy invocation
of the familiar principle of statutory interpretation that exemptions . . .
should be construed narrowly.”84 This principle, however, could not and
did not displace “the presumption that the burden of proof in federal
civil cases is proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”85
The overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the
burden of proof for establishing wage and hour exemptions have
applied similar reasoning and have reached the same conclusion that
was reached by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.86 Courts applying the
preponderance of the evidence standard have expressly or impliedly
relied on a range of settled presumptions. First, in the absence of an
express burden of proof, the burden that applies in civil cases is the
preponderance of the evidence standard.87 Alaska applies the same
principle.88 Second, legislative silence regarding the burden of proof will
result in the preponderance of the evidence standard being applied.89
Finally, exemptions are in the nature of affirmative defenses, and
affirmative defenses are ordinarily established by a preponderance of
the evidence.90
However, there is some contrary authority. The Fourth Circuit
applies a clear and convincing evidence standard as its burden of
proof.91 This standard was imposed in Shockley v. City of Newport News.92
The Shockley court never explained its reasoning or its analysis. Two
other courts have cited and relied on Shockley without comment or

83. Id. at 507.
84. Id. at 508.
85. Id. at 507.
86. See cases cited supra notes 63–64.
87. See States Marine Corp. of Del. v. Producers Coop. Packing Co., 310 F.2d
206, 212 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Yi, 480 F.3d at 507–08.
88. See DeNuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272, 277–78 (Alaska 2003);
Fernandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1, 5 n.13 (Alaska 2002) (citing Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
89. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); United States v.
Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1407 (9th Cir. 1985).
90. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856–57 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc) (in context of Title VII), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
91. See Shockley v. City of Newport News, 997 F.2d 18, 21 (4th Cir. 1993).
92. Id.; see also Clark v. J.M. Benson Co., 789 F.2d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 1986)
(citing Donovan v. United Video, Inc., 725 F.2d 577, 581 (10th Cir. 1984)). But
note that Clark and Donovan both spoke in terms of “clear and affirmative
evidence.” Clark, 789 F.2d at 286; Donovan, 725 F.2d at 581 (emphasis added).

FISHER_FINAL

108

2/7/2011

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[28:1

analysis.93 In addition, an unpublished 1991 decision from the District of
Oregon also applied a clear and convincing standard.94 However, the
court failed to consider existing Ninth Circuit precedent that applies a
preponderance of the evidence standard95 and instead misunderstood a
reference to “clear and affirmative” evidence in Donovan as establishing
a higher burden of proof.96 Donovan did not apply a clear and
convincing burden of proof standard, and other courts studying
Donovan have noted that its reference to “clear and affirmative”
evidence did not establish a heightened burden of proof.97 Indeed, the
“clear and affirmative” language in Donovan came from a 1962 decision
by the Tenth Circuit, which stated that “[o]ne asserting that an employee
is exempt from the wage and hour provisions of the Act has the burden
of establishing the exemption affirmatively and clearly.”98 And this
language itself came from McComb v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co.:
“And one asserting that its employees are exempt from the wage and
hour provisions of the Act has the burden of showing affirmatively that
they come clearly within an exemption provision.” 99 Such language
suggests that the “clear and affirmative” requirement does not raise the
standard of proof so much as describe how that standard must be met.
And indeed, the Tenth Circuit itself has confirmed that the “clear and
affirmative” standard is “merely a different articulation of . . . the
preponderance of the evidence standard.”100
C.

Fred Meyer v. Bailey

However, when the Alaska Supreme Court was faced in Fred Meyer
of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey with the question of which burden of proof to
apply when considering wage and hour exemptions, the court reached a

93. See Astor v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 303, 308 (Fed. Ct. Cl. 2007); Wright
v. Monroe Cnty., No. 05-CV-6268T, 2007 WL 1434793, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 14,
2007).
94. See Hall v. Porter Yett Co., Inc., CIV. No. 90-424-FR, 1991 WL 66830, at *3
(D. Or. Apr. 19, 1991).
95. See Dickenson v. United States, 353 F.2d 389, 392 (9th Cir. 1966); Coast
Van Lines v. Armstrong, 167 F.2d 705, 707 (9th Cir. 1948).
96. Hall, 1991 WL 66830, at *3.
97. See Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2007); Yi v.
Sterling Collision Ctrs., Inc., 480 F.3d 505, 506–08 (7th Cir. 2007).
98. See Legg v. Rock Prods. Mfg. Corp., 309 F.2d 172, 174 (10th Cir. 1962)
(emphasis added).
99. McComb v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 167 F.2d 911, 915 (10th
Cir. 1948), modified on other grounds, 337 U.S. 755 (1949) (emphasis added).
100. Neville v. U.S. Fid. & Gaur. Co., No. 95-6128, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 8739,
at *7–8 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996) (quoting Reich v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 853 F.
Supp. 1325, 1329 n.2 (D. Kan. 1994).
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very different conclusion than did the courts in any of the previously
discussed cases. Ron Bailey was a manager working for the chain
retailer Fred Meyer, which classified him as an exempt executive
employee.101 Other employees filed a class action challenging Fred
Meyer’s wage and hour practices.102 Bailey opted out of the class after he
was threatened by his store manager, who purportedly advised all
managers that they would not be promoted if they joined the class
action.103 Later, however, another store manager clarified that Bailey
would not lose his job if he filed a claim for overtime compensation, and
Bailey filed suit.104
The exemption at issue in Bailey’s case was the old form of the
executive employee exemption under Alaska law.105 Eligibility for this
exemption required six elements: (1) the employee’s primary duty was
management; (2) the employee customarily and regularly directed the
work of two or more employees; (3) the employee had the authority to
hire or fire or could make recommendations that were accorded weight;
(4) the employee customarily and regularly exercised discretionary
authority; (5) the employee did not work more than a set prescribed
percentage of time in non-exempt duties (forty percent for employees
such as Bailey who worked in a retail business); and (6) the employee
was paid on a salary basis.106
Bailey’s case turned on whether or not more than forty percent of
his time at work was spent performing non-exempt activities. The
superior court conducted a bench trial and held that Bailey was nonexempt.107 The court based this result on two findings in particular: that
Bailey’s work included sales, restocking, and customer service tasks that
were not directly or closely related to management and that he spent up
to sixty percent of his time on these non-exempt tasks.108 It necessarily
followed that he was non-exempt regardless of his managerial title. The
superior court also concluded that Fred Meyer was not able to rely upon
the good faith defense to limit liquidated damages and fees and
awarded Bailey $254,056.34 in damages109 and $70,087.50 in attorney’s
fees.110

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See Fred Meyer v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881, 882–83 (Alaska 2004).
Id. at 883.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 884 (citing ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 15.910(a)(7) (2006)).
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 § 15.910(a)(7).
See Fred Meyer, 100 P.3d at 883.
Id. at 885.
Id. at 883. Half of this damage award was liquidated damages. Id.
Id.
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Fred Meyer appealed, arguing primarily that Bailey was, in fact,
exempt.111 The Alaska Supreme Court rejected Fred Meyer’s arguments
and affirmed. Of relevance here, the court instructed that exemptions
are narrowly construed and that “[t]he burden is on the employer to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the employee is exempt.”112 The
court provided no analysis or discussion regarding this point. Instead, it
simply cited Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc.113 in a footnote and
observed that “[c]ontrary to the explicit language in Dayhoff, Fred Meyer
argues that the AWHA requires proof only by a preponderance of the
evidence.”114
The burden of proof argument was not addressed in Fred Meyer’s
opening brief.115 It was not a principal issue on appeal. Bailey included
one sentence in his answering brief in which he simply cited Dayhoff and
stated that “Fred Meyer . . . bears the burden of proving Bailey’s
overtime exemption beyond a reasonable doubt.”116 In response, Fred
Meyer made brief reference to the burden of proof in its reply brief,
which cited one case and a commercial jury instruction guide on the
point, but did not otherwise analyze or explain its argument.117 Oral
argument was never held. Instead, the appeal was submitted on the
briefs.118
The court’s citation to Dayhoff shed no light because the Dayhoff
court never analyzed the issue either. Instead, in Dayhoff, the court noted
that “AWHA is based upon the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and
federal interpretations of FLSA are relevant in interpreting AWHA.”119
The court further stated that “[u]nder federal law, the employer has the
burden to prove the exemption is applicable.”120 The court then
emphasized that exemptions are narrowly construed, and to drive the
point home it quoted a United States Claims Court opinion for the
proposition that “[i]f there is a reasonable doubt as to whether an
111. Id. at 884.
112. Id.
113. 848 P.2d 1367, 1371–72 (Alaska 1993).
114. Fred Meyer, 100 P.3d at 884 n.11.
115. See Brief of Appellant, Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d 881
(Alaska 2004) (No. S-10968), 2003 WL 24048627.
116. See Brief for Appellee at 8, Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey, 100 P.3d
881 (Alaska 2004) (No. S-10958), 2003 WL 24048628.
117. See Reply Brief of Appellant, at 4, Fred Meyer of Alaska, Inc. v. Bailey,
100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004) (No. S-10958).
118. The Alaska Supreme Court’s case management system reflects that the
case was submitted on the briefs on February 19, 2004. See http://
www.appellate.courts.state.ak.us/frames1.asp?Bookmark=S10968 (click “Oral
Argument”) (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
119. Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., 848 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Alaska 1993).
120. Id. at 1371–72.
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employee meets the criteria for exemption, the employee should be
ruled non-exempt.”121
The Claims Court decision in question was Adam v. United States.122
However, the Adam case never analyzed the issue either. Instead, the
court was addressing a threshold issue concerning whether or not
jurisdiction existed; specifically, the court examined whether or not
sovereign immunity had been waived under the circumstances of the
case.123 In the course of resolving this issue, the court quoted a policy
from the Civil Service Commission (an agency that has been replaced by
the Office of Personnel Management) in which the Commission’s policy
declared: “if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether an employee
meets the criteria for exemption, the employee should be ruled
nonexempt.”124 The issue itself, however, was not being argued in the
case and was not actually addressed or analyzed by the court.
D.

2005 Amendments to the Alaska Wage and Hour Act

Before turning to an analysis of the Fred Meyer standard, there is
one additional legal development that needs to be addressed. In 2004 the
United States Department of Labor promulgated new regulations
covering exemptions under the FLSA.125 The purpose was to clarify and
streamline certain exemptions, especially the “white collar” exemptions,
so that the legal standards would be easier to interpret and apply. The
Alaska Legislature followed suit and amended the AWHA in 2005.
House Bill 182 (HB 182) took effect on November 7, 2005, almost one
year to the day after the Alaska Supreme Court issued its opinion in Fred
Meyer v. Bailey.126
Under HB 182, the Alaska Legislature adopted the new federal
regulations used for the section 13 “white collar” exemptions
(professional, executive, administrative, and computer professionals)
and made other revisions to bring Alaska law into conformity with the
FLSA.127 The purpose for the amendments was to bring Alaska law into

121. Id. at 1372 (quoting Adam v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 782, 786 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
122. 26 Cl. Ct. 782 (1992).
123. Id. at 785–86.
124. Id. at 786.
125. For a discussion see Labor Department Overhauled Overtime Regulations,
JABURG WILK, http://www.jaburgwilk.com/articles/overtime-regulations.aspx
(last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
126. 100 P.3d 881 (Alaska 2004).
127. See 2005 Alaska Sess. Laws *1–2; ALASKA H. JOURNAL, 24th Leg., 1st Sess.
2198–99 (2005).
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closer alignment with federal exemption standards.128 HB 182’s sponsor
noted, “[t]he goal of the bill . . . is to bring Alaska code into greater
conformance with the federal law so that employers wouldn’t have such
difficulty when looking at two sets of laws.”129 The Alaska Legislature
did not want different standards governing the same legal rights and
obligations.
As amended by HB 182, the AWHA specifically provides that the
“white collar” exemptions should be interpreted in accordance with the
FLSA.130 Instead of adopting the federal regulations and allowing Alaska
courts and the Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce
Development to interpret those definitions under the AWHA, the
legislature emphasized that the exemptions have “the meaning and shall
be interpreted in accordance with [federal law].”131 Moreover, the
Alaska Legislature did not anchor its amendment in time. Instead, as the
FLSA or its regulations are amended or revised in the future, the AWHA
will automatically track those amendments. As amended, the AWHA
also retained regulations and interpretative guidance instructing that the
FLSA’s regulations and interpretations should govern analysis of the
AWHA’s exemptions.132

II. THE FRED MEYER STANDARD SHOULD BE ABANDONED
Traced back to its origins, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
expressed as dicta in Dayhoff, and then applied as a holding in Fred
Meyer, finds no logical or legal support. It is based on an attempt by an
official of a now-defunct federal agency to articulate the concept that
exemptions should be narrowly construed.133 No other court or
jurisdiction is known to apply a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for
determining whether or not wage and hour exemptions have been
established. It does not comport with precedent, reason, or policy and
should be abandoned.

128.
(2005).
129.
(2005).
130.
131.
132.
133.

See Alaska H. Labor & Commerce Comm. Minutes, 24th Leg., at 18
See id. at 8–10, 15–16; ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 24th Leg., at 4–5
ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1)–(2) (2010).
ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1).
ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1)–(2).
See supra text accompanying note 124.
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Fred Meyer Stands Against Overwhelming Precedent

The Fred Meyer standard is at odds with the overwhelming majority
of state and federal courts that have addressed the issue.134 Indeed, no
other court is known to have actually adopted and applied a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in a case. Even those few courts that have
adopted a heightened burden of proof have stopped at the clear and
convincing evidence standard.135 No court is known to have ventured
further than that except for the Alaska Supreme Court.
Numbers alone should never dictate a result. Just because the
overwhelming majority of courts have concluded that wage and hour
exemptions should be analyzed under a preponderance of the evidence
standard is not, on its own, a sufficient basis for abandoning Fred Meyer.
Indeed, there are circumstances where the Alaska Supreme Court has
staked out positions dramatically at odds with most other courts and
has done so for principled reasons that best comport with how Alaskans
view life, law, and their relationship to society.136 However, where the
clear weight of reasoned authority points in one direction, the court
should at least acknowledge this fact and explain any contrary position.
This is particularly true where, as here, the competing legal principles
are supposed to be interpreted and applied in a consistent manner.
In this respect, the AWHA is patterned after the FLSA.137 Alaska
courts will look to the FLSA and federal case law interpreting and
applying the FLSA for guidance.138 As noted, for FLSA claims, the
overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed this issue have
concluded that the burden of proof for establishing wage and hour
exemptions should be by a preponderance of the evidence.139 Indeed,
this principle has taken firm root in civil pattern jury instruction

134. See supra notes 63–74 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
136. For example, in Ravin v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized a
right to possession of a limited amount of marijuana for personal use in one’s
house based on Alaska’s constitutional right to privacy. 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska
1975). The court based its reasoning on the unique nature of privacy
considerations in Alaska. Id. at 503–04. In Anchorage Police Dep’t Emp.’s Ass’n v.
Municipality of Anchorage, the court struck down a random drug testing policy
for public safety personnel on privacy grounds, notwithstanding the fact that the
vast majority of federal and state courts analyzing similar policies have upheld
such testing. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001). These are merely two examples for
illustrative purposes. In each case, the court took pains to articulate its
reasoning.
137. See Dayhoff v. Temsco Helicopters, Inc., 848 P.2d 1367, 1371 (Alaska
1993).
138. Id.; see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.145.
139. See supra notes 63–74 and accompanying text.
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guides.140 Given that the AWHA is largely based on the FLSA and that
Alaska courts look to the FLSA and its case law for interpretative
guidance, it only makes sense for the AWHA to apply the same burden
of proof that has been adopted and applied by the overwhelming
majority of courts.
In this sense precedent is not simply a numbers game. Instead, it
truly reflects the better weight of reasoned authority, and that authority
is based on an analysis of legal principles that are substantially similar if
not identical to principles recognized in Alaska. Consequently,
evaluated against existing precedent, Fred Meyer falls short.
B.

The Fred Meyer Standard Is Not Supported by Principled Reason

The Fred Meyer standard conflicts with the underlying spirit of the
2005 amendments to the AWHA. The Alaska Legislature adopted
federal standards for several of the same exemptions that are most
frequently litigated.141 The legislature did not want employers to face the
same litigation with different standards governing the outcome.142 Yet
that is precisely what would happen presently. If an employer was
attempting to establish an administrative employee exemption for
claims filed under the FLSA and the AWHA, the burden of proof under
the FLSA claim would be by a preponderance of the evidence while the
burden of proof under the AWHA claim would be beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is not an academic concern; the same exemption defined and
governed by the same regulatory standards would be analyzed under
differing burdens of proof that could easily lead to conflicting results.
The same law and the same facts should be governed by the same
burden of proof—especially when state law commands that Alaska
courts should look to and apply federal law.
The Fred Meyer standard also undermines settled principles that
generally apply to all cases. Civil cases are governed by a
preponderance of the evidence standard.143 That is the default standard
that applies in Alaska as well.144 As a general matter, the Alaska
Legislature is presumed to be familiar with such principles.145 And

140. See 3C O’MALLEY ET AL., supra note 74, at §§ 175.40, 175.50, 175.71.
141. See ALASKA H. JOURNAL, supra note 127.
142. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
143. See States Marine Corp. of Del. v. Producers Coop. Packing Co., 310 F.2d
206, 212 (9th Cir. 1962).
144. See DeNuptiis v. Unocal Corp., 63 P.3d 272, 277–78 (Alaska 2003);
Fernandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1, 5 n.13 (Alaska 2002) (citing Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
145. See, e.g., Purdy v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 762, 764 (D. Alaska 1956)

FISHER_FINAL

2011

5/5/2011 3:20:29 PM

WAGE & HOUR EXEMPTION STANDARD

115

indeed, the legislature established a “clear and convincing” burden of
proof for establishing a good faith defense.146 Thus, its silence in
addressing any burden of proof for exemptions should be interpreted as
accepting the preponderance of the evidence standard.147
The process by which Fred Meyer reached its result is also
problematic. The burden of proof was not actually at issue in the case.
The subject was never identified as an issue on appeal and was never
addressed in the opening brief.148 It was only cursorily referenced in the
opposition brief in a boilerplate paragraph.149 The employer then made
brief reference to the burden of proof in its reply brief but did not
analyze or explain its argument.150 Oral argument was never held.
Instead, the appeal was submitted on the briefs.151 The Alaska Supreme
Court ordinarily never considers arguments that are raised for the first
time in a reply brief.152 It is not clear why the court elected to do so here
and why it adopted such a sweeping rule that runs counter to all
existing precedent without the benefit of oral argument and a more
developed briefing record. With due respect for the court, the issue
deserves more than a dismissive footnote.
The Fred Meyer standard also suffers in that it is seemingly
inconsistent with the AWHA’s statutory scheme. As previously noted,
under the AWHA an employer must establish its good faith by clear and
convincing evidence in order to avoid imposition of liquidated
damages.153 It makes little sense to apply a higher burden of proof to
establish an exemption and then a lower burden of proof to avoid
penalties for a wage and hour violation. This renders the good faith
exception somewhat academic since if an employer can establish an
exemption under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, it would
never have a reason to prove good faith. What would make sense,
however, is to apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to
determine whether or not an exemption exists. If the employer cannot
establish the existence of an exemption under this basic standard then it

(“The Legislature is presumed to know the existing law.”).
146. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(d)–(e) (2010).
147. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
148. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 115.
149. See Brief of Appellee, supra note 116, at *8 (“Fred Meyer, which bears the
burden of proving Bailey’s overtime exemption beyond a reasonable doubt must
prove that Bailey met each of six tests found at [title eight, section 15.910(a)(7) of
the Alaska Administrative Code] to qualify Bailey as an ‘executive.’” (internal
citation omitted)).
150. See Reply Brief for Appellant, supra note 117, at 3.
151. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
152. See Willoya v. State, 53 P.3d 1115, 1125–26 (Alaska 2002).
153. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.110(d)–(e) (2010).
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makes sense to require a greater showing in order for the employer to
avoid imposition of penalties.
C.

Policy Does Not Commend the Fred Meyer Standard

The AWHA protects remedial rights and interests, and an
argument can be made that applying a heightened burden of proof for
exemptions is in keeping with this protective function. Yet the
preponderance of the evidence standard is commonly applied in
situations where significant rights and interests are implicated. For
instance, perhaps the most important federal remedial statutory right is
Title VII, which is designed to eradicate unlawful employment
discrimination.154 In Title VII cases, employers may rebut an employee’s
prima facie case during application of the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting test on less than a preponderance of the evidence.155 Similarly,
Title VII affirmative defenses are established by a preponderance of the
evidence.156 The Alaska Supreme Court has held that preponderance of
the evidence is the appropriate standard to use for evaluating just cause
to terminate public employees—a situation where individuals are
threatened with loss of their livelihood.157 The United States Supreme
Court has held that creditors need only prove entitlement to an
exception to a debtor’s right to discharge by a preponderance of the
evidence.158 One would think that these cases implicate rights and
interests of greater significance than an individual’s right to overtime,
yet a lesser burden of proof has been deemed adequate in all of these
other contexts. Even if one placed an individual’s right to overtime on
equal footing with these other remedial rights, there would not seem to
be any reason to adopt a different (and heightened) burden of proof.
Moreover, there is no support for the conclusion that applying a
preponderance of the evidence standard will erode employees’ rights
and interests protected by wage and hour law. The states and federal
circuits applying the preponderance of the evidence standard have not
evidenced an erosion of rights. Indeed, as noted, the Sixth Circuit
applies a preponderance of the evidence standard to analyze

154. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
155. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259–60 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801–05 (1973).
156. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)
(explaining that in the context of a hostile work environment claim under Title
VII, “a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence”).
157. See Jurgens v. City of North Pole, 153 P.3d 321, 331 (Alaska 2007).
158. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).

FISHER_FINAL

2011

5/5/2011 3:20:29 PM

WAGE & HOUR EXEMPTION STANDARD

117

exemptions,159 yet employees’ claims for overtime have prevailed
nonetheless.160
In addition, there would not seem to be any reason to adopt a
heightened burden of proof to protect overtime since overtime is now
being applied in a manner that actually undermines its initial declared
purposes. As previously discussed, the central purposes underlying
overtime were to create jobs and to protect workers from onerous
working conditions.161 At present, however, employers are finding it
more economical to compel workers to work overtime rather than hiring
new employees because it is less expensive to pay employees overtime
than to hire new workers for whom additional fringe benefits costs
would have to be incurred.162
From a policy perspective, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard
carries risks of unintended consequences—particularly with respect to
its impact on the workplace. Unlike government agencies, private
employers do not have unlimited resources to investigate and prosecute
cases. By virtue of its size and its industries, Alaska has many remote
sites or on-call employees.163 It is reasonable to posit that employers,
knowing that they would need to establish any exemption beyond a
reasonable doubt, would be more likely to adopt burdensome or
intrusive monitoring and recordkeeping policies.
The Fred Meyer standard places an undue burden on Alaska
businesses. Small businesses with a flexible workforce are common in
Alaska.164 In order to be productive, competitive, and cost-efficient,

159. See Renfro v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 497 F.3d 573, 576 (6th Cir. 2007).
160. See Martin v. Ind. Mich. Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 576 (6th Cir. 2004).
161. See SCHOR, supra note 18.
162. See Sherry Slater, Overtime Trumps Hiring, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug.
15,
2010,
available
at
http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/
article?AID=/20100815/BIZ/308159953; Megan Woolhouse, For Small Businesses,
a Hesitancy To Hire, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2011, available at http://
www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2011/02/14/for_small_
businesses__a_hesitancy_to_hire;.
163. Many of Alaska’s wage and hour cases involve employees working at
remote locations or working in on-call situations. See, e.g., Geneva Woods v.
Thygeson, 181 P.3d 1106, 1108 (Alaska 2008) (home visit nurse); Air Logistics of
Alaska, Inc. v. Throop, 181 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Alaska 2008) (helicopter mechanics
working at remote site).
164. Summaries published by the Small Business Administration reflect that
small businesses dominate the Alaskan economic landscape in terms of number
of employers if not revenue. See SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SMALL BUSINESS PROFILE
(2009), available at http://archive.sba.gov/advo/research/profiles/09ak.pdf.
The Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce Development’s most recent
survey of private employers in Alaska was published in July 2010. See ALASKA
DEP’T OF LABOR & WORKFORCE DEV., ALASKA ECONOMIC TRENDS (2010), available at
http://labor.state.ak.us/trends/jul10.pdf.
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employers may need their employees to wear more than one hat. For
example, a manager may have as his or her primary duty management
of the enterprise but may also be expected to tackle non-managerial
duties from time to time as the need arises. Employers shouldering a
beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof to establish an exemption
will face problems efficiently allocating tasks and resources.
Finally, Fred Meyer has the perverse effect of undermining workers’
rights and interests. It encourages employers and businesses to
outsource labor or to use independent contractors instead of employees,
particularly in the more skilled trades or professions. For example, most
businesses need computer professionals to develop and maintain
necessary hardware, software, and servers. Computer professionals
often work long, irregular hours because no one can predict when
viruses will hit or when equipment will fail. Businesses obviously prefer
to classify these employees as exempt and to pay them on a salary basis.
However, if there is doubt concerning whether or not the employees
should be classified as exempt or nonexempt, prudent businesses will
simply outsource the labor for risk management purposes to minimize
exposure to overtime liability. The Fred Meyer standard is custom-built
to engender such doubt. The impact on workers is obvious to anyone
who has actually owned or managed a business or advised business
clients. Most employers offer their employees some level of fringe
benefits (health insurance, retirement or 401K plans, vacation or sick
leave or paid time off) that are not available to independent contractors.
Consequently, the Fred Meyer standard encourages businesses to
outsource labor in skilled trades or professions, which in turn erodes
those workers’ rights and interests. The result is fundamentally at odds
with the declared goals of the FLSA and the AWHA—to improve the
quality of life and living standards for American workers.165
D.

Fred Meyer Can and Should Be Abandoned

Viewed from any angle, the Fred Meyer standard falls short when
analyzed against social, legal, political, or economical concerns. It stands
alone against the greater weight of reasoned authority. Not only does it
stand alone, but it stands mute. We are supplied with no apparent
justification for such a stark rule. The standard frustrates underlying
policy goals and finds no support in precedent or reason. Fred Meyer can
and should be abandoned.

165. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.050 (2010).
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III. AVAILABLE OPTIONS TO ADDRESS AND CORRECT FRED
MEYER
If this Article’s analysis is correct, then the Fred Meyer standard
should be discarded in favor of a preponderance of the evidence
standard. However, even if one disagreed with this Article’s analysis,
the subject deserves more study than a cursory footnote. The following
paragraphs address judicial and legislative options for studying and
remedying Fred Meyer. A court challenge would be slower and
somewhat less predictable but would hopefully provide for a full,
measured consideration of the underlying principles. In contrast,
legislative options most likely would be more time and cost efficient but
perhaps offer less deliberative insight.
A.

Judicial

An employer seeking to challenge the Fred Meyer standard could
attempt to litigate the issue through the courts. The Alaska Supreme
Court accords due regard for precedent in light of principles governing
stare decisis and will not readily overrule precedent.166 The basic test for
overruling an opinion is that the court will do so “only if . . . clearly
convinced that the precedent is erroneous or no longer sound because of
changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from
overturning the case.”167 It is probable that the court would not even
consider the issue unless it was dispositive with respect to the case on
appeal. This means that there would probably have to be an extremely
close case with perhaps a ruling from a superior court judge that the
result was affected by the burden of proof.
Although the Alaska Supreme Court has seldom overruled
precedent, it has happened on a few occasions. One recent case arose in
Kinegak v. State, Department of Corrections, in which the court examined
whether or not a person who was imprisoned longer than he should
have been due to an inadvertent clerical error should be able to allege a
civil claim for negligent supervision or negligent recordkeeping.168
Kinegak was convicted of misdemeanor charges and served seven extra
days when a clerical error caused a miscalculation of the time he was
supposed to serve.169 He filed suit and alleged negligence.170 The State

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

See Kinegak v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 129 P.3d 887, 889–90 (Alaska 2006).
See id.
Id. at 888–89.
Id. at 888.
Id.
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moved to dismiss noting that under Alaska’s sovereign immunity
statute—section 09.50.250(3) of the Alaska Statutes—sovereign
immunity was not waived for false imprisonment claims.171 Kinegak
argued that properly construed, his claim was more in the nature of a
negligent supervision or negligent recordkeeping claim and accordingly
should be viable under Zerbe v. State.172 In Zerbe, the court allowed a
claim after a bench warrant was issued by mistake.173 The Zerbe court
relied on federal authorities that interpreted the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) as allowing claims for negligent recordkeeping to proceed.174
Federal authorities provided persuasive guidance because Alaska’s
statute was patterned after the FTCA.
The State conceded that if Zerbe was still good law, Kinegak’s
complaint should be reinstated.175 However, the State argued that Zerbe
had either been overruled by subsequent Alaska precedent or that more
recent federal case law interpreting and applying the FTCA cast doubt
on the case law and premises upon which the Zerbe court relied.176
In a sharply divided 3-2 opinion, the court agreed with the State
that subsequent federal case law had significantly changed the analytical
foundation underlying Zerbe.177 In particular, it was now clear that a
claim could not arise from negligent supervision, training, or hiring of
government employees.178 The factual circumstances of Kinegaks’s
negligent recordkeeping claim were dependent on a false imprisonment
theory.179 This being so, the majority concluded that Kinegak’s claim
was barred by Alaska’s sovereign immunity statute, which preserved
sovereign immunity for such claims.180
If the right AWHA case came along, Kinegak provides an analytical
foundation for overruling Fred Meyer. Traced back to its source, the Fred
Meyer court relied on uncertain federal precedent that has been rejected
by the overwhelming majority of federal courts. The decision was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound. Moreover, persisting in
applying Fred Meyer would do more harm than good because it would
create the risk of logically inconsistent decisions being reached.

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 889.
Zerbe v. State, 578 P.2d 597, 601 (Alaska 1978).
Id. at 600–01.
Kinegak, 129 P.3d at 889.
Id.
Id. at 890–92.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id. at 893.
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However, under any circumstances, it is difficult to persuade the
Alaska Supreme Court (or any court) to overrule existing precedent. For
example, in Kinegak, the State based part of its argument on the fact that
two prior Alaska Supreme Court decisions had held that Zerbe was
overruled to the extent that it conflicted with their results.181 The
majority, however, was unwilling to adopt this argument because the
cases in question addressed a separate issue concerning whether or not
the State had a duty to exercise due care when initiating civil or criminal
proceedings.182 Moreover, notwithstanding the sound basis for
concluding that subsequent federal case law had materially changed the
analytical foundation underlying Zerbe, the majority garnered only three
of five votes.
Another approach that an employer seeking to challenge the Fred
Meyer standard in court could take is to argue that HB 182 superseded
Fred Meyer. The Alaska Supreme Court has accepted the premise that
legislative action may abrogate or supersede a prior holding.183 In
Sowinski v. Walker, the court held that the Alaska Legislature’s enactment
of pure several liability superseded prior precedent and affected
application of Alaska’s dram shop statute.184 The court explained that “a
prior decision may be abandoned because of ‘changed conditions’ if
‘related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [or] facts have so
changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule
of significant application.’”185
HB 182 fits this standard. The Alaska Legislature specifically
adopted federal “white collar” exemptions.186 The Alaska Legislature
also retained specific guidance directing courts to interpret and apply
the AWHA by reference to federal law.187 The Alaska Legislature made
it clear that it intended to amend the AWHA to bring Alaska law into
closer alignment with federal law and standards.188 The Alaska
Legislature went further than simply adopting federal regulations. The
Alaska Legislature could have adopted the federal definitions and left it
to Alaska courts and the Alaska Department of Labor and Workforce

181. Id. at 889.
182. Id. at 889 n.12.
183. See Sowinski v. Walker, 198 P.3d 1134, 1148 n.45 (Alaska 2008); Pratt &
Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Alaska 1993).
184. Sowinski, 198 P.3d at 1148–49.
185. Id. at 1149 n.45 (quoting Pratt & Whitney Canada, 852 P.2d at 1176).
186. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1)–(2) (2010).
187. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.145 (2010).
188. See ALASKA H. LABOR & COMMERCE COMM. MINUTES, supra note 128, at 8–
10, 15–16, 18; ALASKA H. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, supra note 129, at 4–5.
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Development to interpret those definitions under the AWHA. Instead of
taking this approach, the Alaska Legislature emphasized that the
exemptions have “the meaning and shall be interpreted in accordance
with [federal law].”189 Moreover, the Alaska Legislature did not anchor
its amendment in time. Instead, as the FLSA or its regulations are
amended or revised in the future, the AWHA will automatically track
those amendments.
These considerations support the argument that HB 182 is a
changed condition that essentially abrogates or supersedes the Fred
Meyer standard. The Alaska Legislature intended that the same law
should be governed by the same standards. Allowing a different burden
of proof to govern the same facts and same standards is inconsistent
with HB 182. Accordingly, short of asking the court to overrule Fred
Meyer, an employer could argue that HB 182 legislatively accomplished
that task already.
B.

Legislative

From the perspective of stability, predictability, and confidence in
the judiciary, precedent should seldom be overruled. Although Fred
Meyer represents a poor rule, it would be difficult to secure its
abrogation or to have the case overruled by the Alaska Supreme Court.
The right case would have to come along at the right moment.
A more time and cost efficient solution would be for the Alaska
Legislature to simply amend the AWHA. This could be completed in
one session. Section 23.10.060 of the Alaska Statutes could be amended
to add one subdivision: “(k) In an action to recover unpaid overtime
compensation or unpaid minimum wages, the defendant shall have the
burden of proof to establish the existence of any claimed exemptions by
a preponderance of the evidence.”
The only problem with the legislative option relates to the practical
dynamics of the process. The Alaska Legislature convenes for ninety day
sessions. This does not necessarily allow for measured deliberation. A
concerted lobbying effort would probably be necessary to identify and
explain the issue in advance and to build the required support to secure
passage within the legislature’s short session. However, legislators
would presumably recognize the value in an amendment that is not only
business-friendly but that also protects workers’ rights and carries the
added advantage of bringing clarity and uniformity to the law.

189. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.055(c)(1) (2010).
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CONCLUSION
A sound rule of law should be based on reason, policy, and
precedent. The Fred Meyer standard is not—it finds no support in reason,
policy, or precedent. Whether by judicial or legislative action, the Fred
Meyer standard should be abandoned in favor of the majority rule that
has stood the test of time.

